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Abstract—This paper considers a scenario in which an Alice-
Bob pair wishes to communicate in secret in the presence of an
active Eve, who is capable of jamming as well as eavesdropping in
Full-Duplex (FD) mode. As countermeasure, Bob also operates
in FD mode, using a subset of its antennas to act as receiver,
and the remaining antennas to act as jammer and transmit
noise. With a goal to maximize the achievable secrecy degrees
of freedom (S.D.o.F.) of the system, we provide the optimal
receive/transmit antennas allocation at Bob, based on which we
determine in closed form the maximum achievable S.D.o.F.. We
further investigate the adverse scenario in which Eve knows
Bob’s transmission strategy and optimizes its transmit/receive
antennas allocation in order to minimize the achievable S.D.o.F..
For that case we find the worst-case achievable S.D.o.F.. We also
provide a method for constructing the precoding matrices of
Alice and Bob, based on which the maximum S.D.o.F. can be
achieved. Numerical results validate the theoretical findings and
demonstrate the performance of the proposed method in realistic
settings.
Index Terms—Physical-layer security, Cooperative communi-
cations, Multi-input Multi-output, Active Eavesdropper.
I. INTRODUCTION
Communication security in the presence of malicious nodes
has received a lot of attention. Most of the current literature
addresses the case in which the malicious nodes are passive
eavesdroppers, i.e., they just listen. In that case, the eaves-
droppers reduce the secrecy rate by the rate they can sustain.
Approaches to improve the secrecy rate in the presence of
passive eavesdroppers include multi-antenna techniques [1]–
[4] and artificial noise (jamming) based methods [5]–[13]; all
these methods target at increasing the received signal-to-noise
ratio (SNR) at the legitimate receiver, or decreasing the re-
ceived SNR at the eavesdropper. Jamming can be implemented
by the source [5], the external helper [6]–[11], or the legitimate
receiver who may work in Full-Duplex (FD) mode [12], [13].
Recently, the case of active eavesdroppers has been receiv-
ing a lot of attention. By active eavesdropper we here refer
to a powerful adversary that can jam as well as eavesdrop
the legitimate receiver. One line of research in that area is
gearing towards designing effective active attack schemes for
the purpose of minimizing the achievable secrecy transmission
rate [14]–[16]. Another line of research focuses on detecting
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active attacks and offering countermeasures to guarantee reli-
able secret communications [17]–[23]. In particular, [17]–[19]
consider a massive multi-input multi-output (MIMO) scenario,
in which an active eavesdropper attacks the channel estima-
tion process by transmitting artificial noise. [20], [21], [22],
[23] consider a single-input single-output (SISO) scenario, a
MIMO scenario, a relay scenario, and an OFDM scenario,
respectively, wherein an active eavesdropper tries to reduce the
total network throughput by choosing to be a jammer, or an
eavesdropper, or combination of the above, so that it creates
the most unfavorable conditions for secret communications.
To combat such malicious behavior, the source in [20], [21]
chooses between transmitting, remaining silent or acting as a
jammer. The work of [22], [23] conducts relaying selection
and power allocation among all the available sub-carriers,
respectively.
In this paper, we consider a MIMO Alice-Bob-Eve wiretap
channel, in which Eve is an active eavesdropper, who can
transmit and receive in FD fashion by appropriately allocating
its antennas for transmission or reception. Our goal is to pro-
vide countermeasures that will ensure maximum secrecy from
the point of view of secrecy degrees of freedom (S.D.o.F.).
Our main contributions are summarized as follows.
1) As countermeasure, we proposed an FD Bob, who
transmits jamming signals while receiving. Under this
scenario, we determine in closed form the maximum
achievable S.D.o.F., as function of the number of anten-
nas at each terminal (see eq. (6)). Moreover, we give the
optimal transmit/receive antenna allocation of Bob (see
(7)), which achieves the maximum S.D.o.F..
2) We obtain analytically the worst-case achievable
S.D.o.F. (see eq. (9)), corresponding to the case in which
Eve knows the strategy adopted by Alice and Bob and
optimizes its transmit/receive antenna allocation for the
purpose of minimizing the achievable S.D.o.F..
3) We provide a method for constructing the precoding ma-
trix pair at Alice and Bob, which achieves the maximum
S.D.o.F.. While the aforementioned achievable S.D.o.F.
results do not depend on channel state information (CSI),
the precoding matrices depend on the eavesdropping
channels and also the null space of the self-interference
channels at Eve and Bob.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we describe the system model and formulate the S.D.o.F. max-
imization problem. In Section III, we determine in closed form
the maximum achievable S.D.o.F., and provide an optimal
transmission scheme which achieves the maximum S.D.o.F..
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Fig. 1: (a) Gaussian wiretap channel with an active eaves-
dropper. (b) Helper-assisted Gaussian wiretap channel with a
passive eavesdropper.
In Section IV, we consider an active Eve who knows the
transmission strategy adopted by the legitimate terminals and
tries to minimize the achievable S.D.o.F. by antenna allocation;
for that case, we find the worst-case achievable S.D.o.F..
Numerical results are given in Section V and conclusions are
drawn in Section VI.
Notation: x ∼ CN (0,Σ) means x is a random variable
following a complex circular Gaussian distribution with mean
zero and covariance Σ; (a)+ , max(a, 0); ⌊a⌋ denotes
the biggest integer which is less or equal to a; |a| denotes
the absolute value of a. We use lower case bold to denote
vectors; I represents an identity matrix with appropriate size;
CN×M indicates a N ×M complex matrix set; AH , tr{A},
rank{A}, and |A| stand for the hermitian transpose, trace,
rank and determinant of the matrix A, respectively.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
We consider a Gaussian wiretap channel (see Fig. 1(a))
consisting of Alice, Bob, and Eve, equipped with Na, Nb and
Ne antennas, respectively. Eve is an active agent, who works
in FD mode, i.e., it allocates N re antennas to receive signals
and uses the remaining N te = Ne − N re antennas to transmit
isotropic noise, i.e., ze, with E{zezHe } = (P/N te)I. Alice
wishes to send message s ∼ CN (0, I) to Bob and keep it
secret from Eve. Towards that objective, Bob allocates N rb
antennas to receive the message and uses the remaining N tb =
Nb −N rb antennas to transmit jamming signals, i.e., zb, with
zb ∼ CN (0, I). Since Bob transmits noise while receiving the
signal of interest, he generates self-interference, and so does
Eve. While several self-interference cancelation techniques
have been reported, such as antenna isolation, analog-circuit-
domain based methods and digital-domain based methods, full
self-interference cancelation is still not achievable [24]. To
describe the effect of residual self-interference we employe
the loop interference model of [12], which quantifies the level
of self-interference with a parameter ρ ∈ [0, 1], with ρ = 0
denoting zero self-interference.
To improve the system performance, Alice and Bob will
precode their transmissions, using precoding matrices Va and
Vb, respectively. The signal received at Bob and Eve can be
respectively written as
yb = HbaVas+
√
ρbHbbVbzb +Hbeze + nb, (1)
ye = GeaVas+GebVbzb +
√
ρeGeeze + ne, (2)
where nb ∼ CN (0, I) and ne ∼ CN (0, I) represent ad-
ditive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) vectors at Bob and
Eve, respectively; Hba ∈ CNrb×Na and Hbe ∈ CNrb×Nte
denote the channel matrices from Alice and Eve to Bob,
respectively; Gea ∈ CNre×Na and Geb ∈ CNre×Ntb denote
the channel matrices from Alice and Bob to Eve, respectively;
Hbb ∈ CNrb×Ntb and Gee ∈ CNre×Nte represent the self-
interference channel matrices at Bob and Eve, respectively;
ρb and ρe denote the self-interference level of Bob and Eve,
respectively. The transmitted signals including the message
signal s and the jamming signals zb and ze are independent
of each other, and independent of the noise nb and ne.
Since Alice and Bob are not expected to cooperate with Eve,
Eve cannot do any precoding. The only way Eve can affect
the achievable S.D.o.F. is by optimizing its transmit/receive
antenna allocation.
In the above, the Gaussian signaling assumption is made
in order to maximize the achievable secrecy transmission rate
[25], [26]. Also, the flat fading assumption used in (1), (2) is
valid when the coherence bandwidth of the channel is larger
than the bandwidth of the transmitted signal [27]. Here we
assume that all channels are known at the legitimate nodes,
including the CSI for Eve. This is possible in situations in
which Eve is an active network user and its whereabouts and
behavior can be monitored.
For a given precoding matrix pair (Va,Vb), the maximum
achievable rate at Bob and Eve can be respectively expressed
as [28]
Rb = log|I+ (I+Wb)−1HbaQaHHba|, (3a)
Re = log|I+ (I+We)−1GeaQaGHea|, (3b)
where Qa , VaVHa and Qb , VbVHb denote the input
covariance matrices at Alice and Bob, respectively, with the
average transmit power budget tr{Qa} = tr{Qb} = P ; the
interference covariance matrices at Bob and Eve respectively
are
Wb , ρbHbbQbH
H
bb +
P
N te
HbeH
H
be,
We , GebQbG
H
eb +
ρeP
N te
GeeG
H
ee.
3Correspondingly, the achievable S.D.o.F., representing the
high SNR behavior of the achievable secrecy rate [29], is
ds,a(Qa,Qb) , lim
P→∞
Rb −Re
log P
, (4)
provided that a positive secrecy rate can be achieved.
The goal of this paper is to determine the maximum
achievable S.D.o.F. over the transmission schemes at Alice
and Bob, i.e., the antenna allocation at Bob and the precoding
matrices of Alice and Bob. To that goal, in the following,
we will first determine the optimal number of transmit/receive
antennas at Bob, based on which we then analytically deter-
mine the maximum achievable S.D.o.F.. Subsequently, we find
the worst-case achievable S.D.o.F. for the adverse scenario,
in which Eve is smart and tries to minimize the achievable
S.D.o.F. by adjusting the number of transmit/receive antennas.
III. THE MAXIMUM ACHIEVABLE S.D.O.F.
In [30], [31], we determined the maximum achievable
S.D.o.F. for a helper-assisted Gaussian wiretap channel, which
consists of a source equipped with Ns antennas, a legitimate
receiver equipped with Nd antennas, a passive eavesdropper
equipped with Nep antennas, and an external helper (sending
jamming signals to confuse Eve) equipped with Nh antennas.
In that scenario, the main idea for achieving the maximum
S.D.o.F. is to include into the source and helper precoding
matrix pair the maximum possible linearly precoding vector
pairs along which the message and jamming signals are
aligned into the same received subspace of Eve, subject to the
constraint that the total number of signal streams Bob can see
is no greater than its total number of receive antennas. The
achievable S.D.o.F. equals the number of precoding vectors
that has been included into the source precoding matrix. For
easy reference the helper-assisted Gaussian wiretap channel
studied in [30] is depicted in Fig. 1(b). As we will show next,
the maximum achievable S.D.o.F. of the wiretap channel of
Fig. 1(a) is equal to that of the wiretap channel of Fig. 1(b)
with parameters as given in the following proposition.
Proposition 1: Provided that N te < min{N rb , N re }, the
maximum achievable S.D.o.F. of the MIMO Gaussian wiretap
channel of Fig. 1(a), is equal to that of a helper-assisted
wiretap channel of Fig. 1(b), with Ns = Na, Nh = N tb ,
Nd = N
r
b −N te and Nep = N re −N te .
Proof: See Appendix A.
Remark 1: Based on Proposition 1, one can see that if
N te < min{N rb , N re } the maximum S.D.o.F. of the system
under consideration can be determined based on results on
the helper-assisted wiretap channel. Otherwise, if N te ≥ N rb
and independent of N re , the maximum achievable S.D.o.F.
is zero, since Bob already cannot see any interference-free
subspaces; if N te ≥ N re , Eve cannot see any interference-
free subspaces, and so the maximum achievable S.D.o.F. is
equal to min{(N rb − N te)+, Na}. Therefore, for the purpose
of computing the maximum achievable S.D.o.F. of the system
under consideration, we only need to investigate that of the
corresponding helper-assisted wiretap channel.
Next, we show that for a fixed total number of helper and
destination antennas, i.e., Nh + Nd = Nsum, one can find a
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Fig. 2: The maximum achievable S.D.o.F. for the system with
Na = 10, Nb = 18 and Ne = 20.
solution for the number of helper antennas which achieves
the maximum S.D.o.F.. Details are given in the following
proposition.
Proposition 2: Consider the helper-assisted wiretap chan-
nel of Fig. 1(b). Suppose that Nh and Nd can vary but their
sum is always fixed at Nsum. Then, the maximum achievable
S.D.o.F. is
ds,p = min{δ,Nsum, Ns}, (5)
where δ , ⌊ (Nsum−|Ns−Nep|)+3 ⌋+ (Ns −Nep)+.
1) If Nsum ≤ Nep −Ns, the maximum achievable S.D.o.F.
is zero for any pair of (Nh, Nd).
2) If Nsum ≤ Ns−Nep, the maximum S.D.o.F. is achieved
when Nd = Nsum with no antennas being allocated to
the helper.
3) If Nsum > |Ns−Nep|, the maximum S.D.o.F. is achieved
when Nh = Nˆh, where
Nˆh =
{
Nep −Ns + ⌊Nsum−|Ns−Nep|3 ⌋ if Ns ≤ Nep,
⌊Nsum−|Ns−Nep|3 ⌋ if Ns > Nep,
and the remaining Nsum− Nˆh antennas are assigned to
the legitimate receiver.
Proof: See Appendix B.
Combining Proposition 1 and Proposition 2, we can deter-
mine the maximum achievable S.D.o.F. for the system under
consideration as follows.
Theorem 1: Consider a MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel,
as depicted in Fig. 1(a). The maximum achievable S.D.o.F. is
ds,a(N
t
e) =
{
min{(Nb −N
t
e)
+, Na} if N
t
e ≥ N
r
e ,
min{η, (Nb −N
t
e)
+, Na} if N
t
e < N
r
e ,
(6)
with η , ⌊ (Nb−Nte−|Na−Nre+Nte|)+3 ⌋+(Na−N re +N te)+. The
maximum S.D.o.F. is achieved when Bob uses N tb
⋆
antennas
to transmit, with N tb
⋆ given in (7) at the top of the next page,
and the remaining Nb −N tb⋆ antennas receive.
Proof: See Appendix C.
Theorem 1 provides the number of transmit antennas at Bob
which achieves the maximum S.D.o.F.. This is is illustrated
in Fig. 2, where we plot the maximum achievable S.D.o.F.
for the system with Na = 10, Nb = 18 and Ne = 20.
Specifically, for a given antenna number pair (N te , N tb), we
4N tb
⋆
=


N re −N te −Na + ⌊
Nb −N te − |Na −N re +N te|
3
⌋ if N te < min{N re , Nb − |Na −N re +N te|} and Na ≤ N re −N te
⌊Nb −N
t
e − |Na −N re +N te|
3
⌋ if N te < min{N re , Nb − |Na −N re +N te|} and Na > N re −N te
0 otherwise
(7)
plot the achievable S.D.o.F. based on Remark 1. For each fixed
N te , we find, with the numerical search method, the points
which achieve the maximum S.D.o.F., and mark them with
red crosses. Looking at the slice of the graph corresponding
to a fixed N te , one can see that there are one or more N tb ’s
which achieve the maximum S.D.o.F., and N tb
⋆
marked by a
blue circle, coincides with one of those red crosses.
A. The proposed transmission scheme which achieves the
maximum S.D.o.F.
With the optimal allocation of trnasmit/receive antennas at
Bob, we next construct the pair (V⋆a,V⋆b ) which achieves the
maximum S.D.o.F..
1) For the case of N tb⋆ = 0, and along the lines of
Appendix A, one can see that the wiretap channel of Fig.
1(a) is equivalent to a classic three-node wiretap channel,
with the main channel and eavesdropping channel being
equal to U0b
H
Hba and U0e
H
Gea, respectively. Here, U0b
and U0e are the orthonormal basis of the null space
of Hbe and Gee, respectively. Therefore, by applying
the precoding matrix design of the three-node wiretap
channel of [3], the maximum S.D.o.F. can be achieved.
According to [3], the precoding matrices are constructed
by selecting those linearly independent precoding vec-
tors along which the legitimate channel has better quality
than the eavesdropping channel.
2) For the case of N tb⋆ 6= 0, and along the lines of
Appendix A, one can see that the wiretap channel
of Fig. 1(a) is equivalent to a classic helper-assisted
wiretap channel, with the channels to Bob being equal
to U0b
H
Hba and U0b
H
Hbb, the channels to Eve being
equal to U0e
H
Gea and U0e
H
Geb, and the number of
antennas being Ns = Na, Nh = N tb , Nd = N rb −N te and
Nep = N
r
e −N te . Therefore, by applying the precoding
matrix design of [30], [31] to this equivalent helper-
assisted wiretap channel, the maximum S.D.o.F. can be
achieved. The main idea here is to select the maximum
possible number of linearly independent precoding vec-
tor pairs along which the message and jamming signals
are aligned into the same received subspace of Eve.
In particular, we divide the candidate set of precoding
vector pairs into three subsets, i.e., C1, in which the
message signal sent by Alice spreads within the null
space of the eavesdropping channel, C2, in which the
message does not spread within the null space of the
eavesdropping channel and Bob is self-interference free,
and C3, in which the message does not spread within the
null space of the eavesdropping channel and Bob suffers
from self-interference. We select precoding vector pairs
from C1 first, followed by C2 and then C3, until there
are no more candidate precoding vector pairs or the total
number of signal streams Bob can see is equal to its
total number of receive antennas. For more details on
determining the number of candidates of each subset
and their formulas, please refer to [30], [31]. It is worth
noting that (to be used in Section V) the formulas of
the precoding vector pairs in C1 only depend on the
channel matrix U0e
H
Gea; the formulas of the precoding
vector pairs in C3 only depend on the channel matrices
U0e
H
Gea and U0e
H
Geb; in addition to U0e
H
Gea and
U0e
H
Geb, the formulas of the precoding vector pairs in
C2 also depend on the channel matrix U0b
H
Hbb.
IV. WORST-CASE ACHIEVABLE S.D.O.F. IN THE
PRESENCE OF A SMART Eve
In this section, we consider a scenario in which Eve knows
the transmit strategies at both Alice and Bob, and therefore
it derives ds,a(N te), based on which it adjusts the number
of its transmit antennas in order to minimize the achievable
S.D.o.F., i.e., ds,a(N te). In that case, the worst-case maximum
achievable S.D.o.F. is
dwcs,a = min
0≤Nte≤Ne
ds,a(N
t
e). (8)
Theorem 2: Consider the MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel
of Fig. 1(a). Assume that Eve knows the transmit strategies at
Alice and Bob. Then, the maximum achievable S.D.o.F. is given
in (9), which is shown at the top of next page.
Proof: See Appendix D.
Theorem 2 enables us to make some interesting observa-
tions, which are given in the following Corollaries.
Corollary 1: For the purpose of minimizing the achievable
S.D.o.F., Eve will jam or eavesdrop, but will not adopt a
combination of both.
Proof: From the proof of Theorem 2 in Appendix D, one
can see that the minimum value of ds,a(N te) is obtained only
when N te = 0 or N te = Ne. This completes the proof.
Corollary 2: If Nb > Ne, a positive S.D.o.F. can always be
achieved with the proposed cooperative transmission scheme.
Proof: With the expression of (9), it can be verified that
the worst-case achievable S.D.o.F. is greater than zero for the
case of Nb > Ne. This completes the proof.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
As already mentioned, the achievable S.D.o.F. reveals the
high SNR behavior of the achievable secrecy rate. In this
section, we consider a more realistic SNR scenario, and
demonstrate the secrecy rate performance of the proposed
5dwcs,a =


0 if Ne ≥ Nb,
min{⌊Nb −Ne +Na
3
⌋, Nb −Ne, Na} if max{Nb −Na
2
, Na} ≤ Ne < Nb,
min{⌊Nb −Na +Ne
3
⌋+Na −Ne, Nb −Ne} if Nb −Na
2
≤ Ne < min{Nb, Na} and Ne > Na −Nb,
Nb −Ne if Nb −Na
2
≤ Ne < min{Nb, Na} and Ne ≤ Na −Nb,
Na if Ne < min{Nb −Na
2
, Nb}.
(9)
(0,0)
Alice Bob
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Fig. 3: Model used for numerical experiments.
approach. In particular, we consider a scenario as shown in
Fig. 3. Alice and Bob are respectively fixed at coordinates
(−R, 0) and (R, 0) (unit: meters). The smaller the R, the
higher the received SNR at Bob will be. Eve can move in
one of the following two ways, i.e., parallel to the x-axis and
between the points (−20,−R) and (20,−R), and parallel to
the y-axis and between the points (0, 10) and (0, 0).
Unless otherwise specified, we consider the strong self-
interference level ρb = ρe = ρ = 1, and we set Na = 4,
Nb = 7, N
t
e = 1 and N re = 5. The transmit power of
each node is P = 0dBm. The noise power level is set as
σ2 = −60dBm. The power is equally allocated between
different signal streams at each node. According to Theorem
1, for the above system, the maximum achievable S.D.o.F. of
2 can be achieved by choosing N tb = 2, N rb = 5. Setting
N tb = 2, N
r
b = 5, and according to Section III. A, one can
see that the system under consideration is equivalent to the
helper-assisted wiretap channel of Fig. 1(b), with the number
of antennas being Ns = 4, Nh = 2, Nd = 4 and Nep = 4; for
that helper-assisted wiretap channel, the number of candidate
precoding vector pairs in C1, C2 and C3 are respectively 0, 0
and 2. Following the construction method of Section III. A and
since Nd = 4 and for each precoding vector pair in C3 Bob
suffers from self-interference, we can select two precoding
vector pairs in C3 without violating the constraint that the
total number of signal streams Bob can see is no greater than
its total number of receive antennas. Therefore, a total of two
precoding vector pairs can be picked, and as such a number
of two message signal streams will be sent from Alice. We
construct the precoding matrix pair assuming exact knowledge
of the channels.
With the precoding matrix pair, we examine the achievable
secrecy transmission rate, i.e., (Rb − Re)+, where Rb and
Re are given by (3a) and (3b), respectively [28]. Results are
obtained based on 1, 000 Monte Carlo runs. In each run, the
effect of the channel on the transmitted signal is modeled by a
multiplicative scalar of the form d−c/2ejθ [32], where d is the
distance between the transmit and receive terminals, c is the
path loss exponent and θ is a random phase, which is taken
to be uniformly distributed within [0, 2pi) and independent
between runs. The value of c is typically in the range of 2
to 4. In our simulations we set c = 3.5. We assume that the
distance of different combinations of transmit-receive antennas
corresponding to the same link is the same, and as such the
corresponding path loss is the same.
For comparison, we also plot the average achievable secrecy
rate of the half-duplex (HD) scheme, wherein Bob receives
with all of its antennas. For the HD scheme, the precoding
matrix of Alice consists of the generalized eigenvectors cor-
responding to the largest two generalized eigenvalues of the
matrix pair [3]
(HˆHba(I+
P
N te
HˆbeHˆ
H
be)
−1Hˆba, Gˆ
H
ea(I+
ρeP
N te
GˆeeGˆ
H
ee)
−1Gˆea),
(10)
where Hˆba and Hˆbe denote the channel matrices to Bob,
Gˆea and Gˆee represent the channel matrices to Eve. From
Section III. A, the proposed transmission scheme in terms
of the achievable S.D.o.F. can be either equivalent with a
three-node wiretap channel when N tb
⋆
= 0, or equivalent
with a helper-assisted wiretap channel when N tb
⋆ 6= 0. In the
former case, the proposed scheme reduces to an HD scheme.
In the latter case, the proposed scheme always achieves a
greater S.D.o.F.. For comparison fairness, in the HD scheme
we consider selecting the same number of message signal
streams as in the proposed scheme.
Figs. 4 and 5 illustrate the average achievable secrecy
transmission rate as function of Eve’s position, with the x-
coordinate varying from −20 to 20 and the y-coordinate fixed
at −R. Fig. 4 corresponds to R = 10, which represents a low
SNR scenario for Bob, while Fig. 5 corresponds to R = 1,
which is a high SNR scenario for Bob. From Fig. 4, one can
see that the proposed FD scheme performs overall better than
the HD scheme, except when Eve is to the left of Alice or to
the right of Bob. The behavior in the latter cases should be
expected, since when Eve is to the left of Alice, the received
jamming signal is too weak to disturb Eve’s channel. As a
result, the HD scheme, which uses all of Bob’s antennas to
receive, performs better. When Eve is to the right of Bob,
the received SNR is already small even if Bob does not send
jamming signals, and as a result, the HD scheme also performs
better. Naturally, for the higher SNR case, the advantage of the
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Fig. 4: Average achievable secrecy rate versus the position of
Eve along the x-coordinate. The distance parameter R = 10.
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proposed FD approach is bigger and evident over the entire
range (see Fig. 5). To illustrate the secrecy rate advantage of
using the proposed antenna allocation at Bob, i.e., N tb = 2
and N rb = 5, in Fig. 5 we also plot the achievable secrecy
transmission rate for another allocation, i.e., N tb = 3 and
N rb = 4; in that case and according to Section III. A, one can
see that only an S.D.o.F. of 1 can be achieved. As expected,
the achievable secrecy transmission rate of that latter case is
almost half of the proposed case, for which an S.D.o.F. of 2
can be achieved.
In Fig. 6, we plot the average achievable secrecy trans-
mission rate versus the position of Eve along the y-axis, for
the case of R = 10 and R = 5. The figure shows that for
both cases, the achievable secrecy transmission rate of the
proposed FD scheme remains constant for all positions of Eve.
In contrast, the achievable secrecy transmission rate of the HD
scheme decreases as y approaches zero. This can be explained
as follows. As Eve comes closer to Alice, it receives a stronger
signal, and as a result the secrecy rate of the HD scheme
decreases. On the other hand, in the proposed FD scheme,
the message signal sent by Alice and the jamming signal sent
by Bob are aligned into the same received subspace of Eve,
thus keeping Eve’s eavesdropping capability constant, and as
a result, keeping the achievable secrecy rate of the proposed
FD scheme constant.
Fig. 7 illustrates the average achievable secrecy transmis-
sion rate of the proposed scheme as function of the self-
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Fig. 7: Average achievable secrecy rate versus the self-
interference level.
interference level ρ, and that of the HD scheme as function
of the self-interference level ρe, for the case of R = 10
and R = 1. We should note that since for the HD scheme
Alice determines its precoding matrix with (10), the achievable
secrecy transmission rate only relates to ρe. One can see that
the achievable secrecy rate of the FD scheme increases as
ρ increases. This is because, by aligning the message and
jamming signals into the same received subspace of Eve, the
proposed scheme delivers a distorted message signal to Eve,
which makes the eavesdropping channel more sensitive to self-
interference. Therefore, the achievable secrecy rate of the FD
scheme increases with increasing level of self-interference.
While the achievable secrecy rate of the HD scheme also
increases with increasing level of the self-interference at Eve,
the increase is small as compared to the proposed scheme.
In order to separately check the effect of the self-
interference level, i.e., ρb or ρe, on the achievable secrecy
rate performance of the proposed scheme, in Fig. 8, we
set ρe = 10−3 and plot the average achievable secrecy
transmission rate versus the self-interference level ρb; also,
we set ρb = 10−3 and plot the average achievable secrecy
transmission rate versus the self-interference level ρe. One
can see that the achievable secrecy transmission rate decreases
slightly with ρb, while it increases drastically with ρe. This
can also be explained by the fact that, for the FD scheme the
eavesdropping channel is more sensitive to self-interference.
In practice, perfect channel estimates are difficult to obtain.
710
-6
10
-5
10
-4
10
-3
10
-2
10
-1
10
0
b
ρ
Proposed scheme, 
Proposed scheme, 
3
10
e
ρ −=
3
10
b
ρ −=
e
ρor
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
A
e
ra
g
e 
S
ec
re
c
y
 D
a
ta
 R
a
te
 (
b
/s
/H
z
)
Fig. 8: Average achievable secrecy rate versus the self-
interference level. The distance parameter R = 10.
Since the proposed precoding matrix design highly depends on
the channels, we next examine the secrecy rate performance
in the presence of imperfect channel estimates. We model
imperfect CSI through a Gauss-Markov uncertainty of the form
[33]
Gei = d
−c/2
ei
(√
1− α2G¯ei + α∆G¯ei
)
, i = a, b, (11)
where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 denotes the channel uncertainty. α = 0 and
α = 1 correspond to perfect channel knowledge and no CSI
knowledge, respectively. The entries of G¯ei are ejθ with θ be
a random phase uniformly distributed within [0, 2pi). ∆G¯ei ∼
CN (0, I) represents the Gaussian error channel matrices. dei
denotes the distance from Alice or Bob. With the same channel
model as in (11), we model the channel uncertainty of the
channels Hbi, i = a, b, e. We construct the precoding matrix
pair (Va,Vb) with the estimated channels.
In Fig. 9, we plot the achievable secrecy rate with respect
to the channel uncertainty in Hbi, i = a, b, e, for the proposed
antenna allocation scheme, i.e., N tb = 2, N rb = 5. It can
be observed that the achievable secrecy rate remains constant
for different channel uncertainties of Hbi, i = a, b, e. This
should be expected, since the constructed precoding matrix
pair consists of two precoding vector pairs from C3, whose
formulas only depend on the matricesU0e
H
Gea andU0e
H
Geb.
Therefore, the channels Hbi, i = a, b, e do not enter in the
construction of the precoding matrix pair. Indeed, for the
equivalent helper-assisted wiretap channel with the antenna
allocation given by Proposition 2, i.e., Nˆh, it can be verified
that there are no candidate precoding vector pairs in C2.
Therefore, the achievable secrecy rate of proposed scheme is
independent of the channel uncertainties of Hbi, i = a, b, e.
As illustrated in Fig. 2, for a given fixed N te there may be
more than one N tb ’s which can achieve the maximum S.D.o.F..
Intuitively, those schemes achieving the same S.D.o.F. can also
achieve the same secrecy rate performance, which, combined
with the fact that the proposed schemes’s achievable secrecy
rate remains unchanged even when the channel estimates turns
noisy, indicates that the proposed scheme will outperform the
others. Next, with simulations we show that advantage of
the proposed scheme. Let’s take the antenna allocation, i.e.,
N tb = 4, N
r
b = 3, as an example. Substituting N tb = 4,
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Fig. 9: Average achievable secrecy rate versus channel uncer-
tainty. The distance parameter R = 10.
N rb = 3 into Section III. A, one can see that the maximum
S.D.o.F. of 2 can also be achieved. In particular, with N tb = 4,
N rb = 3 the system under consideration is equivalent to the
helper-assisted wiretap channel of Fig. 1(b), with the number
of antennas being Ns = 4, Nh = 4, Nd = 2 and Nep = 4; for
that helper-assisted wiretap channel, the number of candidate
precoding vector pairs in C1, C2 and C3 are respectively 0,
2 and 2. Following the construction method in Section III. A,
we first select the two candidate precoding vector pairs in C2.
Since Nd = 2, we cannot pick any more precoding vector pairs
without violating the constraint that the total number of signal
streams Bob can see is no greater than its total number of
receive antennas. Concluding, a total of two precoding vector
pairs can be picked from C2, and as such an S.D.o.F. of 2
can be achieved [30], [31]. Based on Fig. 9 one can see that
the proposed scheme, i.e., N tb = 2, N rb = 5, and that with
N tb = 4, N
r
b = 3, provide the same secrecy rate performance
when the channel estimates are perfect. Moreover, when the
channel estimates are noisy, i.e., α > 0, the proposed scheme
outperforms the other one, since the achievable secrecy rate
of the proposed scheme remains unchanged while that of the
other scheme drops with the increase of uncertainty in the
channels Hbi, i = a, b, e. This is because, unlike the proposed
scheme the formulas of the precoding vector pairs of the other
one are from C2, and as such they depend on the channel
U0b
H
Hbb.
On the other hand, in Fig. 9 it can be observed that the
achievable secrecy rate drops with the increase of uncertainty
in the channelsGbi, i = a, b, e. This should be expected, since
the benefits brought by the proposed scheme come from the
successful alignment of the message and jamming signals at
Eve. To achieve that goal, the exact knowledge of the channels
Gei, i = a, b, e, is necessary. As a conclusion, one can see
that the uncertainty in the channels Gei, i = a, b, e, is more
dangerous.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have analytically addressed the S.D.o.F. maximization
problem of a MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel in the presence
of an active Eve. Specifically, we have proposed a Full-Duplex
Bob scheme, where Bob divides the antenna set into two parts,
one devoted to receiving and the other to jamming. Based on
8the proposed scheme, we have derived the optimal number
of transmit/receive antennas at Bob, and determined the max-
imum S.D.o.F., as a function of the number of antennas at
each terminal. We have further found the worst-case achievable
S.D.o.F. for the adverse scenario in which Eve knows the
transmit strategies and tries to minimize the S.D.o.F. by adjust-
ing its number of transmit/receive antennas. Our analysis has
revealed that a positive S.D.o.F. can be guaranteed as long as
it holds that Nb > Ne. We have also constructed a precoding
matrix pair which achieves the maximum S.D.o.F.. Numerical
results have revealed the advantages of the proposed secrecy
transmission scheme over the existing half-duplex scheme, and
have validated the robustness of the proposed scheme under
realistic scenarios.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF Proposition 1
Given an arbitrary point (Va,Vb), with tr{Qa} = P and
tr{Qb} = P . We can respectively rewrite Qa and Qb as
Qa = P Q¯a and Qb = P Q¯b, with tr{Q¯a} = tr{Q¯b} = 1.
Correspondingly, (3a) can be rewritten as
Rb = I
2
b − I1b , (12)
where
I1b , log|I+ PMHbbQ¯bHHbb|, (13a)
I2b , log|I+ PM(HbbQ¯bHHbb +HbaQ¯aHHba)|, (13b)
with M , (I+ P
N te
HbeH
H
be)
−1
.
Let HbeHHbe =
[
U1b U
0
b
] [ Σb 0
0 0
] [
U1Hb
U0Hb
]
be the
singular value decomposition (SVD), and then
M = U1b(I+
P
N te
Σb)
−1U1Hb +U
0
bU
0H
b . (14)
Substituting (14) into (13a) and (13b), respectively, we obtain
lim
P→∞
I1b
log(P )
= lim
P→∞
log|I+ P H¯bbQ¯bH¯
H
bb|
log(P )
, (15a)
lim
P→∞
I2b
log(P )
= lim
P→∞
log|I+ P (H¯bbQ¯bH¯
H
bb + H¯baQ¯aH¯
H
ba)|
log(P )
,
(15b)
where H¯bb , U0Hb Hbb, H¯ba , U0Hb Hba.
Combining (12), (15a) and (15b), we arrive at that
lim
P→∞
Rb
log(P )
= lim
P→∞
log|I+ (I+ P H¯bbQ¯bH¯
H
bb)
−1P H¯baQ¯aH¯
H
ba|
log(P )
.
(16)
Letting GeeGHee =
[
U1e U
0
e
] [ Σe 0
0 0
] [
U1He
U0He
]
be the
SVD, and applying the same derivations from (12) to (16), we
obtain that
lim
P→∞
Re
log(P )
= lim
P→∞
log|I+ (I+ P G¯ebQ¯bG¯
H
eb)
−1P G¯eaQ¯aG¯
H
ea|
log(P )
,
(17)
where G¯ea , U0He Gea and G¯eb , U0He Geb.
Combining (16) and (17), one can see that the achievable
S.D.o.F. is equal to that of a helper-assisted wiretap channel,
with the channels to Bob as U0Hb Hba and U0Hb Hbb, and the
channels to Eve as U0He Gea and U0He Geb, respectively. Since
N te < N
r
b and N te < N re , and all the channel matrices are
assumed to be full rank, this helper-assisted wiretap channel
has effective number of antennas Ns = Na, Nh = N tb , Nd =
N rb −N te and Nep = N re −N te . This completes the proof.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF Proposition 2
It can be verified that, for the case of Nsum ≤ Ns − Nep,
the maximum achievable S.D.o.F. equals Nsum, which is
consistent with (5); for the case of Nsum ≤ Nep − Ns,
the maximum achievable S.D.o.F. equals 0, which is also
consistent with (5). Thus, in the sequel, we only need to focus
on the case of Nsum > |Ns −Nep|, in which
ds,p = min{δ,Nsum, Ns}, (18)
where δ = ⌊Nsum−|Ns−Nep|3 ⌋+ (Ns −Nep)+.
According to Theorem 1 of [30] or equation (36) of [31],
the maximum achievable S.D.o.F. for such a helper-assisted
wiretap channel is
g(Nh) = min{dc=1(Nh) + d⋆c=2(Nh), Nd, Ns}, (19)
where
dc=1(Nh) , (Ns −Nep)+ + s1(Nh), (20a)
d⋆c=2(Nh) , min{s2(Nh), ⌊(Nd − dc=1(Nh))+/2⌋}, (20b)
with
s1(Nh) , (min{Ns, Nep}+min{(Nh −Nd)+, Nep} −Nep)+,
s2(Nh) , (min{Ns, Nep}+min{Nh, Nep} −Nep)+ − s1(Nh).
In the following, we will consider two distinct cases, i.e., the
case of Ns ≤ Nep and the case of Ns > Nep. For each case
we first give a specific value of Nh, denoted by Nˆh, which
satisfies g(Nˆh) = ds,p. We then prove that for any Nh 6= Nˆh,
it holds that g(Nh) ≤ ds,p. In this way, we complete the proof
of Proposition 2.
A. For the case of Ns ≤ Nep
It holds that δ = ⌊Nsum − |Ns −Nep|
3
⌋.
Let Nˆd = 2⌊Nsum − |Ns −Nep|
3
⌋+ i, and
Nˆh = ⌊Nsum − |Ns −Nep|
3
⌋+ (Nep −Ns), (21)
where i , Nsum − 3N¯d. By definition i ∈ {0, 1, 2}.
A. 1 When δ ≥ Ns
In this subcase, it can be verified that Nsum ≥ Ns. Thus,
(18) becomes
ds,p = Ns. (22)
On the other hand, since Nˆh ≥ Nep, (20a) becomes
dc=1(Nˆh) = Ns. (23)
9Substituting (23) into (19) and combined with the fact that
min{Nˆd, Ns} = Ns, we arrive at g(Nˆh) = Ns. Besides, by
(19) the inequality g(Nh) ≤ Ns always holds true. Therefore,
the maximum value of g(Nh) over Nh is
g(Nˆh) = Ns
(a)
= ds,p,
where (a) comes from the equality in (22).
A. 2 When δ < Ns
In this subcase, it can be verified that δ < Nsum. Thus, (18)
becomes
ds,p = δ. (24)
On the other hand, since Ns ≤ Nep and Nˆh− Nˆd ≤ Nep−
Ns, (20a) and (20b) respectively becomes
dc=1(Nˆh) = 0, (25)
d⋆c=2(Nˆh) = δ. (26)
Substituting (25) and (26) into (19) and combined with the
fact that min{δ, Nˆd, Ns} = δ, we obtain
g(Nˆh) = δ
(a)
= ds,p, (27)
where (a) comes from the equality in (24).
Next, we will prove that for any other Nh 6= Nˆh it holds that
g(Nh) ≤ ds,p, thus completing the proof that the maximum
value of g(Nh) over Nh is g(Nˆh) = ds,p. To achieve that
goal, we introduce N¯d = ⌊Nsum − |Ns −Nep|
3
⌋, and
N¯h = 2⌊Nsum − |Ns −Nep|
3
⌋+ i+ (Nep −Ns).
With similar derivations from (22) to (27) it can be verified
that g(N¯h) = ds,p = g(Nˆh). In the remaining text of this
subsection, we will show that for any other Nh 6= N¯h it holds
that g(Nh) ≤ ds,p.
i) For any Nh > N¯h, it holds that Nd < N¯d. In addition,
by (19) it holds that g(Nh) ≤ Nd. Therefore,
g(Nh) < N¯d = ds,p.
ii) For any Nh < N¯h, say Nh = N¯h − k with k ≥ 1, i.e.,
Nh = 2N¯d + i+ (Nep −Ns)− k,
Nd = N¯d + k.
Thus, Nh −Nd = N¯d + (Nep −Ns) + i− 2k < Nep, which,
together with (20a), gives
dc=1(Nh) = (N¯d + i− 2k)+. (28)
1) For the case of 2k ≤ N¯d+ i, (28) becomes dc=1(Nh) =
N¯d + i − 2k, which, combined with (20b), gives
d⋆c=2(Nh) ≤ ⌊
3k − i
2
⌋. Therefore,
g(Nh) ≤ dc=1(Nh) + d⋆c=2(Nh)
≤ N¯d + i− 2k + ⌊3k − i
2
⌋
(a)
≤ N¯d (b)= ds,p.
Here, since i ≤ 2 and k ≥ 1, it holds true that i− 2k+
⌊3k − i
2
⌋ ≤ 0, and as a result, (a) holds true; (b) comes
from the equality in (24).
2) For the case of N¯d + i < 2k ≤ 2(N¯d + 1), (28)
becomes dc=1(Nh) = 0. In addition, by (20b), it
holds that d⋆c=2(Nh) ≤ ⌊Nd/2⌋, which, combined with
Nd = N¯d+k ≤ 2N¯d+1, indicates that d⋆c=2(Nh) ≤ N¯d.
Therefore,
g(Nh) ≤ d⋆c=2(Nh) ≤ N¯d = ds,p.
3) For the case of k ≥ N¯d+2, (28) becomes dc=1(Nh) = 0.
Therefore,
g(Nh) ≤ d⋆c=2(Nh) ≤ s2(Nh)
= min{Ns, Ns +Nh −Nep}
≤ 2N¯d + i− k ≤ N¯d + i− 2
≤ N¯d = ds,p.
Based on the above two subcases, i.e., A. 1 and A. 2, one
can see that for the case of Ns ≤ Nep the maximum value of
g(Nh) over Nh is g(Nˆh) = g(N¯h) = ds,p. It is worth noting
that, although both Nˆh and N¯h can achieve the maximum
S.D.o.F., as it can be observed in Section V, for the helper-
assisted wiretap channel with the antenna allocation given by
Nˆh, the formulas of the candidate precoding vector pairs are
independent of the channel matrices to Bob. Therefore, when
the channel estimates are noisy the proposed scheme with
Nh = Nˆh outperforms that scheme with Nh = N¯h in terms
of the achievable secrecy rate.
B. For the case of Ns > Nep
It holds that δ = ⌊Nsum − |Ns −Nep|
3
⌋+ (Ns −Nep).
Let Nˆd = 2⌊Nsum − |Ns −Nep|
3
⌋+ j + (Ns −Nep), and
Nˆh = ⌊Nsum − |Ns −Nep|
3
⌋, (29)
where j , Nsum− 3Nˆ tb . By definition, j ∈ {0, 1, 2}. Besides,
since Nˆh < Nˆd, it holds that
dc=1(Nˆh) = Ns −Nep. (30)
B. 1 When Nˆh ≥ Nep
In this subcase, it can be verified that Ns ≤ δ and Ns ≤
Nsum. Thus, (18) becomes
ds,p = Ns. (31)
On the other hand, since Nˆh ≥ Nep, it holds that
s2(Nˆh) = Nep. (32)
Substituting (30) and (32) into (19) yields g(Nˆh) = Ns. In
addition, by (19) the inequality g(Nh) ≤ Ns always holds
true. Therefore, the maximum value of g(Nh) over Nh is
g(Nˆh) = Ns
(a)
= ds,p,
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where (a) comes from the equality in (31).
B. 2 When Nˆh < Nep
In this subcase, it can be verified that δ ≤ Ns and δ ≤ Nsum.
Thus, (18) becomes
ds,p = δ = Nˆh + (Ns −Nep). (33)
On the other hand, Nˆh < Nep combined with (20b), gives
d⋆c=2(Nˆh) = Nˆh. (34)
Substituting (30) and (34) into (19) yields
g(Nˆh) = Nˆh + (Ns −Nep) (a)= ds,p,
where (a) comes from the equality in (33).
In the sequel, we will prove that for any other Nh 6= Nˆh
it holds that g(Nh) ≤ ds,p, thus completing the proof of that
the maximum value of g(Nh) over Nh is g(Nˆh) = ds,p.
i) For any Nh < Nˆh, it holds that dc=1(Nh) = Ns − Nep
and d⋆c=2(Nh) = Nh < Nˆh. Therefore,
g(Nh) ≤ dc=1(Nh) + d⋆c=2(Nh) ≤ ds,p. (35)
ii) For any Nh satisfying Nh > Nˆh and Nh ≤ Nd, it holds
that dc=1(Nh) = Ns −Nep. Based on (20b) it holds that
d⋆c=2(Nh) ≤ ⌊(Nd − dc=1(Nh))+/2⌋
≤ ⌊(Nˆd − 1− dc=1(Nh))+/2⌋
= Nˆh + ⌊(j − 1)/2⌋,
which, combined with the fact j ≤ 2, indicates that,
d⋆c=2(Nh) ≤ Nˆh. Therefore, the inequalities in (35) also hold
true.
iii) For any Nh satisfying Nh > Nˆh and Nh > Nd, we will
first give a specific value of Nh, denoted by N¯h, which satisfies
g(N¯h) ≤ ds,p. We then prove that for any other Nh 6= N¯h it
holds that g(Nh) ≤ g(N¯h). In this way, we finish the proof
that g(Nh) ≤ ds,p.
Note that since Nsum = Nh + Nd > 2Nd, for the case
of Nsum ≤ 2(Ns − Nep) it holds that Nd < (Ns − Nep),
which, combined with g(Nh) ≤ Nd, indicates that g(Nh) <
Ns − Nep < ds,p. Therefore, in the following arguments we
only need to focus on the case of Nsum > 2(Ns −Nep).
Let N¯d = ⌊Nsum − 2|Ns −Nep|
3
⌋+ (Ns −Nep), and
N¯h = 2⌊Nsum − 2|Ns −Nep|
3
⌋+ τ + (Ns −Nep), (36)
where τ , Nsum− 3⌊Nsum − 2(Ns −Nep)
3
⌋− 2(Ns−Nep).
By definition, it holds that τ ∈ {0, 1, 2}.
Substituting (36) into (20a), we arrive at
dc=1(N¯h) = Ns −Nep +min{⌊Nsum − 2|Ns −Nep|
3
⌋+ τ,Nep},
which, combined with (19), gives
g(N¯h) = N¯d = ⌊Nsum − 2|Ns −Nep|
3
⌋+ (Ns −Nep).
(37)
On comparing (33) and (37), one can see that
g(N¯h) ≤ ds,p. (38)
On the other hand, for any Nh < N¯h, say Nh = N¯h − k,
k ≥ 1, it holds that Nd = N¯d + k. Thus, Nh − Nd = N¯h −
N¯d − 2k < Nep, which together with (20a), indicates that
dc=1(Nh) = (Ns −Nep) + ⌊Nsum − 2|Ns −Nep|
3
⌋+ τ − 2k
(a)
= g(N¯h) + τ − 2k,
where (a) is due to (37). In addition, by (20b) we have
d⋆c=2(Nh) ≤ ⌊(Nd − dc=1(Nh))+/2⌋ ≤ ⌊
3k − τ
2
⌋.
Since τ ≤ 2 and k ≥ 1, it holds that τ − 2k+ ⌊3k − τ
2
⌋ ≤ 0.
Therefore,
g(Nh) ≤ dc=1(Nh) + d⋆c=2(Nh) ≤ g(N¯h). (39)
Moreover, for any Nh > N¯h, it holds that
g(Nh) ≤ Nd < N¯d = g(N¯h). (40)
Combining (39) with (40), one can see that for any other
Nh 6= N¯h satisfying Nh > Nˆh and Nh > Nd, it holds that
g(Nh) ≤ g(N¯h), which, combined with (38), indicates that
g(Nh) ≤ ds,p. This completes the proof.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF Theorem 1
In the sequel, we will consider three distinct cases.
1) For the case of N te ≥ N re , Eve cannot see any
interference-free subspaces, and so the maximum
achievable S.D.o.F. is equal to lim
P→∞
Rb
log P
, whose
maximum value over the input covariance matrices is
min{(Nb − N te)+, Na}. In that case, there is no need
for Bob to transmit jamming signals to reduce the
interference-free subspace that Eve can see, and so we
set N tb
⋆
= 0.
2) For the case of N te < N re and N te ≥ Nb the maximum
achievable S.D.o.F. is zero since Bob already cannot
see any interference-free subspaces. In that case, the
achievable S.D.o.F. will be zero even if Bob transmits
jamming signals, and so we set N tb⋆ = 0.
3) For the case of N te < N re and N te < Nb, no positive
S.D.o.F. can be achieved if N rb ≤ N te , and thus, in
order to maximize the achievable S.D.o.F., Bob should
choose a value of N rb such that N rb > N te . In that case,
and by Proposition 1, one can see that the maximum
achievable S.D.o.F. is equal to that of a helper-assisted
wiretap channel with number of antennas Ns = Na,
Nh = N
t
b , Nd = N
r
b − N te , Nsum = Nb − N te
and Nep = N re − N te . Substituting these values into
Proposition 2, we arrive at we arrive at the expression
of N tb
⋆
, i.e., Nˆh, and also the maximum achievable
S.D.o.F., i.e., min{η,Nb −N te, Na}.
Concluding the above three cases, one can obtain the
expressions of ds,a(N te) and N tb
⋆
, as given in (6) and (7),
respectively. This completes the proof.
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APPENDIX D
PROOF OF Theorem 2
We should note that for the case of Ne ≥ Nb, the best
choice for Eve is to allocate Nb antennas to transmit; for that
case no positive S.D.o.F. can be achieved. In what follows, we
only need to study the nontrivial case of Ne < Nb.
From (6), one can see that the achievable S.D.o.F. for
the case of N re < N te is no greater than that of the other
case. Therefore, to make sure that the achievable S.D.o.F. is
minimized, Eve would always choose the value of N te such
that N te < N re ; for that case
ds,a(N
t
e) = min{η,Nb −N te, Na}, (41)
with η , ⌊ (Nb−Nte−|Na−Nre+Nte|)+3 ⌋+ (Na −N re +N te)+.
Looking into the expression of η, we get two thresholds
of N te , i.e.,
Ne −Na
2
and Nb +Ne −Na
3
. Since Ne < Nb, it
holds that Ne −Na
2
<
Nb +Ne −Na
3
. In order to simply the
expression of ds,a(N te), in the following we will consider three
distinct cases, which are obtained by those two thresholds.
1) For the case of N te ≤
Ne −Na
2
, it holds that
η = ⌊Nb +Na −Ne +N
t
e
3
⌋ ≤ ⌊Nb −N
t
e +Na +Ne
3
⌋
(a)
≤ Nb −N te,
where (a) comes from the fact that
Na +Ne ≤ 2(Ne −N te) < 2(Nb −N te).
Thus, (41) becomes
m1(N
t
e) = min{⌊
Nb +Na −Ne +N te
3
⌋, Na}.
2) For the case of Ne −Na
2
< N te <
Nb +Ne −Na
3
, it
holds that
η = ⌊Nb −Na +Ne
3
⌋+Na −Ne +N te.
In addition, due to N te <
Nb +Ne −Na
3
it holds that
2N te ≤ 2⌊
Nb +Ne −Na
3
⌋
⇒ 2N te < Nb +Ne −Na − ⌊
Nb +Ne −Na
3
⌋
⇒ ⌊Nb +Ne −Na
3
⌋+Na −Ne +N te < Nb −N te.
Thus, (41) becomes
m2(N
t
e) = min{⌊
Nb +Ne −Na
3
⌋ +Na −Ne +N
t
e , Na}.
3) For the case of N te ≥
Nb +Ne −Na
3
, it holds that
η = Na −Ne + 2N te.
Besides, it holds that Nb−N te ≤ Na−Ne+2N te, which,
combined with 2N te < Ne, indicates that Nb−N te < Na.
Thus, (41) becomes
m3(N
t
e) = Nb −N te.
Concluding the above three cases, one can see that
dwcs,a = min
0≤Nte≤Ne
min{m1(N te),m2(N te),m3(N te)}. (42)
In the sequel, we will consider three distinct cases, accord-
ing to whether mi(N te), i = 1, 2, 3, is feasible. For example,
for the case of Ne < Na, m1(N te) is infeasible, since by
definition it ranges N te ≤
Ne −Na
2
< 0 which is unavailable.
A. When max{Nb −Na
2
, Na} ≤ Ne < Nb
It holds that Ne −Na
2
≥ 0 and Nb +Ne −Na
3
≤ Ne,
which indicates that both m1(N te) and m3(N te) are feasible.
Moreover,
min
Nte≤
Ne−Na
2
m1(N
t
e) = m1(0) = min{⌊
Nb +Na −Ne
3
⌋, Na},
min
Nte≥
Nb+Ne−Na
3
m3(N
t
e) = m3(Ne) = Nb −Ne.
As to m2(N te), it is feasible only for the case of
⌊Ne −Na
2
⌋+ 1 < Nb +Ne −Na
3
, in which
min
Ne−Na
2
≤Nte≤
Nb+Ne−Na
3
m2(N
t
e) = m2(
Ne −Na − ξ
2
+ 1)
= min{⌊Nb +Ne −Na
3
⌋+ Na −Ne − ξ
2
+ 1, Na}.
Here, ξ = 1 if Ne −Na is odd and otherwise ξ = 0.
Since Na ≤ Ne < Nb, it holds that
⌊Nb −Ne +Na
3
⌋ ≤ ⌊Nb +Ne −Na
3
⌋ − ⌊2(Ne −Na)
3
⌋.
In addition, it can be verified that Ne−Na+ξ2 −1 ≤ ⌊ 2(Ne−Na)3 ⌋.
Therefore, we have m1(0) ≤ m2(Ne−Na−ξ2 + 1).
Combining (42) with the above discussions, one can see
that for the case of max{Nb −Na
2
, Na} ≤ Ne < Nb,
dwcs,a = min{m1(0),m3(Ne)}
= min{⌊Nb +Na −Ne
3
⌋, Nb −Ne, Na}.
B. When Nb −Na
2
≤ Ne < min{Nb, Na}
It holds that Ne −Na
2
< 0 and Nb +Ne −Na
3
≤ Ne,
which indicates that m3(N te) is feasible and m1(N te) is
infeasible. Moreover,
min
Nte≥
Nb+Ne−Na
3
m3(N
t
e) = m3(Ne) = Nb −Ne.
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m2(N
t
e) is feasible only for the case of Nb−Na+Ne > 0,
in which case it holds that
min
Nte≥
Nb+Ne−Na
3
m2(N
t
e) = m2(0)
= min{⌊Nb +Ne −Na
3
⌋+Na −Ne, Nb −Ne}.
Combining (42) with the above discussions, we have the
following conclusions:
1) For the case of Nb −Na
2
≤ Ne < min{Nb, Na} and
Nb −Na +Ne > 0, it holds that
dwcs,a = min{⌊
Nb +Ne −Na
3
⌋+Na −Ne, Nb −Ne}.
2) For the case of Nb −Na
2
≤ Ne < min{Nb, Na} and
Nb −Na +Ne ≤ 0, it holds that
dwcs,a = Nb −Ne.
C. When Ne < min{Nb −Na
2
, Nb}
It holds that Nb +Ne −Na
3
> Ne, which indicates that
m3(N
t
e) is infeasible, and m2(N te) is feasible.
m1(N
t
e) is feasible only for the case of Ne ≥ Na, in which
case it holds that
dwcs,a = min{m1(0),m2(
Ne −Na − ξ
2
+ 1)}
(a)
= m1(0)
(b)
= Na.
where (a) is due to m1(0) ≤ m2(Ne −Na − ξ
2
+ 1). (b) is
due to the fact that ⌊Nb +Na −Ne
3
⌋ ≥ Na, which is due to
2Ne < Nb −Na and Ne ≥ Na.
Also, for the case of Ne < Na, we have
dwcs,a = m2(0)
= min{⌊Nb +Ne −Na
3
⌋+Na −Ne, Na}
= Na.
Concluding, for the case of Ne < min{Nb −Na
2
, Nb}, it
holds that dwcs,a = Na. This completes the proof.
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